Alaska’s DigitalBridge Bet: LNG Pipeline, Data Centers & Risk Under Governor Dunleavy

The recent reporting reveals substantial overlap between Alaska’s investment strategy via the CBR (its primary rainy-day fund) and its economic doctrine under Governor Dunleavy—specifically in aligning private equity infrastructure deals (DigitalBridge) with the state’s energy export ambitions (Alaska LNG). These trends merit close scrutiny lest emerging financial and political risks compound already fragile state finances.

Financial Commitment and Risk Profile
Former Revenue Commissioner Adam Crum committed $50 million of the CBR to a long‐term private equity contract with DigitalBridge in late July 2025, after Governor Dunleavy had announced Crum’s impending resignation. Other sources assert that total exposure could be up to $75 million. Private equity investments such as these are generally illiquid and high-risk—often locking capital for 5–15 years—raising questions about whether this matched the CBR’s mandate for safety and liquidity.

Dunleavy’s Data‐Centers Pivot and Infrastructure Strategy
Governor Dunleavy has promoted data centers as a key demand driver (“anchor tenant”) to help justify the Alaska LNG pipeline’s high fixed costs. DigitalBridge, which owns the cell‐tower firm Switch, has conducted site scouting, hosted Dunleavy at its Las Vegas headquarters, and has reportedly been engaged in placing data center investment in Alaska. This suggests coordination between state leadership’s economic strategy and private infrastructure ventures.

Alaska LNG: Momentum, Costs, and Strategic Partnerships
The Alaska LNG project is estimated at $44 billion, including an approximately 800‐mile pipeline from Alaska’s North Slope to a liquefaction terminal in Nikiski; in January 2025, state agency AGDC entered into a framework deal with Glenfarne Group to lead the project privately, with Alaska retaining ~25% state ownership. The state has secured legally binding steel supply and investment commitments from POSCO, and expects final investment decisions by late 2025 for the pipeline and in 2026 for export operations.

Transparency, Timing & Oversight Concerns
Key concerns have emerged: Crum stated the deal was approved by Dunleavy’s office and the Department of Law, and that he delayed resignation so the DigitalBridge deal would be completed. Dunleavy’s calendar reportedly shows meetings with DigitalBridge before finalization, but his administration has declined to clarify involvement. The legislature passed SB 183 to increase financial oversight of the Department of Revenue; Crum’s deal was signed just before this law—and before increased scrutiny—could take effect.

Strategic Implications & Open Questions
Strategically, aligning LNG exports, data center build‐out, and investment into digital infrastructure could generate synergies: increased energy demand, security of data infrastructure, and export revenues. However, risks abound. Capital allocated to opaque private equity under misaligned guidelines could worsen Alaska’s fiscal stress—especially if projected returns underperform or are delayed. Politically, internal transparency, legal compliance, and appropriate risk disclosure are likely to become flashpoints. Key open questions include:

• What has been the full evaluation of DigitalBridge’s private equity credentials (past returns, exposure to SoftBank?) and risk‐mitigation steps in the CBR deal?
• To what extent Governor Dunleavy was fully informed, in writing, about the DigitalBridge‐CBR terms prior to its signing?
• How will data center demand materialize in Alaska given challenges around energy supply, land, cooling, and connectivity?
• What is the realistic schedule and financing plan for the Alaska LNG pipeline and associated infrastructure?
• Could legislative accountability measures (e.g. SB 183) materially change ongoing or planned deals of similar kind?