- The Ulpravda article could not be fully accessed or independently corroborated, so its specific claims remain unverified.
- Independent reports warn of rising systemic stress in Russian banking, including surging 90+ day delinquencies and loan restructuring that may hide losses.
- CMASF argues a systemic crisis could emerge by late 2026 if problem assets or deposit withdrawals breach key thresholds.
- The Central Bank of Russia says capital buffers and collateralized corporate books keep current risks below critical levels, but spillover risk to weaker regional and consumer-lending banks is elevated.
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First, the primary article from Ulpravda could not be accessed in full during this research. No corroboration was found from other reliable sources for its specific claims. As such, its content remains unverified; reliance on it should be cautious.
By contrast, several independent and authoritative reports paint a concerning picture of the Russian banking sector heading into 2026:
• The Kremlin-aligned Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting (CMASF) warns of a systemic banking crisis that could crystallize by October 2026 if problem assets exceed 10% of the banking system or if mass deposit withdrawals begin.
• As of October 2025, Russia already had 2.3 trillion rubles in loans overdue by more than 90 days—unsecured consumer loans in particular are seen as especially risky. Problems are amplified by credit restructuring that masks the scale of default risk.
• Despite those risks, the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) claims that corporate non-performing loans remain under 5%, backed by collateral and reserves, and that the financial system’s capital buffers (estimated at ~8 trillion rubles) exceed regulatory minimums.,
From a strategic investment banking standpoint, these signals suggest heightened risk for stakeholders exposed to:
- Banks with large consumer unsecured loan portfolios, facing increasing default risk.
- Regional banks or credit institutions lacking strong collateral or reserves.
- Sectors or companies with tight cash flows and limited access to refinancing, especially small and medium-size businesses.
Policymakers are likely to maintain or tighten regulation, reserve requirements, and supervision. They may also deploy selective support measures or interventions to stabilize critical banks.
Open questions include:
- Will the growth in non-performing loans trigger broad deposit withdrawals, i.e. a run-like event?
- To what extent will restructuring delay recognition of losses, and what is the true size of hidden bad debt?
- What will the Central Bank and government do if the predicted systemic thresholds are crossed — will they nationalize, recapitalize, or let weaker institutions fail?
- How will external shocks (e.g., oil price drops, sanctions, inflation pressures) interact with domestic financial stress to drive tipping points?
Supporting Notes
- The CMASF report identifies that non-performing unsecured consumer loans in Russia reached 2.3 trillion rubles by October 2025; this is up 1.6× from earlier in the year, with credit restructuring masking much of the deterioration.
- The share of non-performing loans in the corporate loan portfolio remains under 5%, largely covered by reserves and collateral according to the CBR.
- Banks’ capital buffers remain above regulatory minimums, with total system capital estimated around 8 trillion rubles.
- Rising concern over deposit risk: if widespread withdrawals begin or assets decline, systemic stress could surpass thresholds requiring interventions equal to more than 2% of GDP or restructuring/nationalization of over 10% of banks.
- Other pressures include weak cash flows in export-oriented sectors, high interest burdens from tightening monetary policy, and downward pressures from external demand.,
- Budgetary and taxation trends in 2025 show real company profits in decline, government revenue growth dependent on tax increases (e.g., NDS/VAT rises to 22%), affecting both corporate health and regional financial capacity.