Boaz Weinstein’s Push for UK Investment Trust Reform: NAV Discounts & Governance Shake-Up

Boaz Weinstein’s campaign represents one of the most high-profile activist investor challenges in the UK investment trust sector in decades. Since late 2024, Saba Capital has built sizeable minority stakes (19%-29%) in seven closed-end funds and sought to replace their boards, push for new investment mandates, and secure options for shareholders to exit at—or near—NAV [3][4][2]. These seven—dubbed the “Miserable Seven” by critics—include trusts run by Baillie Gifford, Janus Henderson, Herald, and others [2][4][7].

Despite the boldness of Saba’s proposals, all seven trusts rejected its board replacement resolutions via shareholder votes. Herald Investment Trust, the most valuable of the group, was defeated by about 65% to 35% margin, with non-Saba votes almost unanimously opposing Saba’s plan [1][4]. Edinburgh Worldwide, among others, also rejected similar proposals [4][7].

The opposition has centered on several themes: lack of clarity in Saba’s plans, concerns over fee structures should Saba take over as manager, questions over whether current performance issues are structural or driven by external market conditions, disagreements over benchmark selection, and worries about concentrated power being held by minority shareholders [5][7][6]. For example, in the EWIT case, Saba compared returns to the FTSE All-Share Index; EWIT’s chair countered that their benchmark is the S&P Global Small Cap Index, in which they have outperformed [7].

Strategically, Weinstein’s campaign may have achieved indirect wins: several trusts have initiated shareholder‐friendly actions such as buybacks, tender offers, or narrowing discounts—actions perhaps spurred by activist pressure—even without agreeing to Saba’s board nominees [2][4][6]. Additionally, Weinstein has hinted at expanding his activism to possibly 30 more trusts [3][5], which if realized could induce broader reform across the £250-£270 billion market [2][4].

Open questions remain over how the UK regulatory regime will respond—particularly from the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)—regarding disclosures, governance standards, and protection of retail investors when minority shareholders attempt such influence. Moreover, Saba’s own track record—especially its underperformance versus benchmarks in the US—and the economic feasibility of delivering exits at NAV, particularly for illiquid or private asset-heavy trusts, pose risks to the realization of Weinstein’s vision [6][5].