How Big Tech Turns AI Rules & Export Controls Into Competitive Edge

The landscape of U.S. tech policy—particularly around AI and semiconductor export controls—has experienced a rapid transformation in 2025 into early 2026. The initial inspiration article, which reported $109 million in lobbying by Silicon Valley heavyweights, fits into a broader trend documented across multiple sources: Big Tech, along with newer AI players, escalated their Washington spending to secure favorable regulation, support exports, and shape competitive dynamics.

Export policy change is central. Previously strict controls on selling high-performance chips like Nvidia’s H200 to China under the Biden administration have been reversed. Under Trump, the U.S. Commerce Department has issued regulations permitting exports of the H200 and equivalent chips under conditions: exports only to approved customers, with third-party performance reviews, caps ensuring U.S. supply is prioritized, and bans on military end-use among others. Notably, 25% of the revenue from such exports is to go to the U.S. government. Meta, Amazon, and Google have also been pushing on bills relating to AI regulation, export policy, online safety, trade, and more—lobbying around how AI gets regulated domestically has become a primary issue.

Beijing’s reaction complicates things. Although Washington has relaxed rules, Chinese customs authorities have taken steps to block shipments of the H200. Suppliers in China curtailed production, likely to avoid losses amid regulatory and trade uncertainty. These developments suggest that China is still wary of U.S. export policy shifts—even when Washington permits certain flows. The success of U.S. policy changes thus hinges not only on U.S. enforcement but also on Beijing’s compliance and the state of diplomatic relations.

Strategic coherence and enforcement are under question. Analysts from institutions like CFR point out that while new rules are intended to balance national security with commercial opportunity, many of the compliance requirements—such as certifying no supply delays to U.S. customers or ensuring end-use restrictions—are difficult to verify. Even mechanisms such as caps on chip volume are potentially large. For example, the regulation could allow ~1 million H200 chips exported to China (half of what U.S. customers receive), which could shift the compute base significantly.

Lobbying reflects alignment and influence. The accelerated lobbying spend is not just reactive; it reflects deep alignment between large tech firms and the Trump administration’s AI-friendly stance, especially around innovation over regulation. Companies like Nvidia, Meta, and OpenAI have substantially expanded their presence in Washington. This trend is reshaping how AI policy is made—more executive orders, more agency rules, fewer new laws. But with multiple executive branch and administrative levers involved, many regulatory details remain in process—and courts and Congress could still push back.

Strategic implications for industry and policy:

• American chipmakers such as Nvidia, AMD, and Intel stand to benefit from expanded export markets, especially if policies are enforced and reciprocal flows resume.
• However, risks include possible U.S.-China friction over security, supply chain disruptions, and China-local resistance (or countermeasures), potentially undermining commercial gains.
• For AI companies, gains depend on how regulation evolves—looser restrictions could accelerate growth; but gaps in policy may expose firms to legal, compliance, or reputational risk.
• The policy environment appears volatile: executive decisions, agency rules, and export licensing processes are all subject to change, which creates both opportunity and uncertainty.

Open questions remaining:

• How strictly will U.S. agencies enforce third-party review and end-use restrictions over exported chips?
• Will China continue its blocking behavior, or negotiate clearer import rules to coordinate with U.S. export policy?
• Will Congress attempt to reimpose or legislate in areas the executive has relaxed (e.g., AI safety laws, export controls)?
• How will smaller AI labs and chipmakers respond—will they gain access under the new licensing framework or be crowded out?
• What are the potential trade, national security, and diplomatic consequences if exported chips are diverted or misused despite controls?