- Private-equity and alternative-asset executives now earn far more than top Wall Street bankers, reflecting a sharp shift in financial power.
- PE-backed companies have become a major pillar of the U.S. economy, employing over 13 million people and generating roughly 7% of GDP.
- Weaker exit markets are pushing PE firms toward tools like continuation funds and NAV loans, heightening concerns about opacity and conflicts with limited partners.
- As PE firms expand into credit, insurance, and other bank-like activities with lighter oversight, worries are growing about systemic risks from this shadow banking sector.
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The recent Barron’s article underscores a marked reordering of financial power: private-equity and alternative-asset firms are not just catching up to legacy banks, they’re surpassing them in compensation, influence, and reach [1]. The data from Equilar reveal that named executive officers (NEOs) at PE/alt firms have earned on average $2.3 billion since mid-2000s vs. $331 million at major banks. Even after removing prominent outliers—Schwarzman, Kravis, Roberts—PE executives still exceed $1 billion. The median compensation gap (PE/alt vs banks: ~$376 million vs ~$133 million) further reflects broad-based outperformance, not just elite exceptions [1].
Economically, PE/alt firms also make up a significant share of U.S. economic activity. According to the American Investment Council (AIC) with EY, private equity-backed businesses directly employ approximately 13.3 million workers, paid ~$85,000 in average wages and benefits, generated $2 trillion in GDP in 2024, and represent ~7% of U.S. GDP. Those figures signal that PE is no niche, but a major sector with widespread downstream impacts [2].
Yet with growth and rewards come growing structural pressures. According to McKinsey’s “Global Private Markets Report 2025” and other sources, limited partner (LP) dissatisfaction is rising: exits are difficult in a high-rate environment, traditional IPO/Aggregate exit channels are constrained, and innovators are resorting to continuation funds or selling assets internally—practices that may exacerbate agency conflicts or opacity [3]. Furthermore, regulatory oversight is thin for PE firms operating broker-dealer, insurance, and credit activities, placing them in “shadow banking” territory that could pose systemic risks [1].
Strategically, this transition means traditional banking firms must not only compete for talent and compensate similarly, but also reckon with PE/alt firms’ encroachment into businesses once dominated by banks (credit, underwriting, advisory). Legacy banks enjoy regulatory scale advantages in some areas, but may be squeezed in their core fee streams. Meanwhile, for investors, endowments, and stakeholders, there’s a trade-off between the upside from exposure to PE and the downside from rising leverage, liquidity constraints, and valuation risks.
Open questions include: How long can PE/alt firms sustain the compensation premiums given macroeconomic headwinds? Will rising political or regulatory pressure follow financial crises caused by shadow banking exposures? And can LP returns justify allocations in the face of rising fee scrutiny and reduced transparency?
Supporting Notes
- Equilar measures show average NEO of PE/alt firms earned ~$2.3 billion since 2006 (and shares sold since 2003), vs ~$331 million for legacy bank NEOs [1].
- Excluding Steve Schwarzman ($35 billion) and Henry Kravis & George Roberts (both ~$11 billion), average PE/alt executive still over $1 billion [1].
- Median total compensation: legacy banks ~$133 million vs PE/alt ~$376 million (or ~$324 million excluding the three high-earners) [1].
- PE-backed businesses employ 13.3 million U.S. workers, up from c.12 million in 2022, at average wages and benefits of ~$85,000 annually [2].
- These firms contributed about $2 trillion in GDP in 2024, about 7% of U.S. GDP; tax contributions of ~$337 billion [2].
- McKinsey reports that since 2024, distributions (DPI) finally exceeded contributions; dealmaking and sponsor-to-sponsor exits increased, while fundraising for traditional commingled funds fell 24% year over year; PE firms cite macro uncertainty and high interest rates as growing risks [3].
- Practices like continuation funds and NAV loans are increasingly used to return capital to early-stage investors while retaining asset ownership, raising questions about valuation and alignment with LP interests [3].
- PE firms have expanded into roles traditionally held by banks—credit, insurance, broker-dealer services—with minimal regulatory oversight, prompting concerns over systemic risk [1].
Sources
- [1] www.barrons.com (Barron’s) — Dec 5, 2025
- [2] www.investmentcouncil.org (American Investment Council) — June 9, 2025
- [3] www.mckinsey.com (McKinsey) — May 20, 2025
