- China has launched a National Venture Capital Guidance Fund plus three regional “hard tech” VC funds to back strategic sectors such as chips, quantum tech, biomedicine, brain-computer interfaces, and aerospace.
- The guidance fund starts with 100 billion yuan of state capital and aims to mobilize around 1 trillion yuan in total public and private funding, with each regional fund exceeding 50 billion yuan.
- Capital will target early-stage firms valued under 500 million yuan, with single investments capped at 50 million yuan and a 20-year fund life (10 years investing, 10 years exiting).
- The initiative is designed to deepen China’s technological self-reliance, channel patient capital into high-risk hard technologies, and sharpen its position amid intensifying global tech competition.
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On December 26, 2025, the Chinese government announced via state media (CCTV/Xinhua) the launch of a National Venture Capital Guidance Fund and three regional sub-funds to invest in “hard technology” sectors. Each regional fund is backed with over 50 billion yuan (≈ US$7.14 billion) [1][2]. The National Guidance Fund is initially endowed with 100 billion yuan of government capital, and its long-term goal is to mobilize up to 1 trillion yuan (≈ US$142–143 billion) of public plus social capital. [2][4]
The funds target early-stage innovators in sectors deemed strategically important: integrated circuits, quantum technology, biomedicine, brain-computer interfaces, aerospace, among others. Valuation ceilings per company are set at 500 million yuan; individual investments must not exceed 50 million yuan. [1][2][4] Furthermore, the funds will run over a 20-year lifespan (10 years investing, 10 years harvesting), reflecting recognition that ROI in hard tech is long horizon and high risk. [2][4]
Compared to previous efforts—such as ICBC’s 80 billion-yuan hard tech innovation fund launched in March 2025 [6]—these new funds are larger in aggregate scale and more narrowly focused on early-stage, frontier technologies rather than broader tech or advanced manufacturing. [6] This likely springs from both intensifying geopolitical competition, especially in semiconductors and strategic technologies, and domestic economic pressures: slowing growth, weak industrial output, and a need for high value-added innovation. [1][7]
Strategic implications include potential acceleration of technology self-reliance, a pull for foreign and private capital into Chinese hard tech sectors under government guidance, and increased pressure on other major tech powers (notably the U.S.) in areas like quantum and semiconductors. However, risks remain: avoiding duplication and inefficiency, ensuring the quality and commercial viability of funded innovations, balancing state direction with market principles, and managing capital exit and return risks over two decades. Open questions include how social/private capital will be mobilized, what metrics will govern success, the governance and transparency of sub-funds, and how this interacts with foreign investment restrictions or export controls.
Supporting Notes
- The National Venture Capital Guidance Fund is backed by 100 billion yuan of government capital and aims to mobilize total funding of 1 trillion yuan. [2][4]
- Three regional hard-technology funds have been launched, each with more than 50 billion yuan capital. [1][2]
- Investment targets: startups valued under 500 million yuan; individual investment cap at 50 million yuan. [1][2]
- Sectors include integrated circuits, quantum tech, biomedicine, brain-computer interfaces, and aerospace. [1][2]
- Fund duration: 20 years (10 years investing, 10 years exit) to allow for long development cycles in hard technology. [2][4]
- Focus is on early/mid-stage companies, especially seed and startup phases, to fill gaps in patient capital. [2][4]
Sources
- [1] www.reuters.com (Reuters) — 2025-12-26
- [2] www.geo.tv (Geo.tv) — 2025-12-26
- [3] www.yicaiglobal.com (Yicai Global) — 2025-12-26
- [4] www.bloomberg.com (Bloomberg) — 2025-12-27
- [5] www.scmp.com (South China Morning Post) — 2025-12-26
- [6] www.reuters.com (Reuters) — 2025-03-12
- [7] www.reuters.com (Reuters) — 2025-12-26
